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PERSONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM LICENSES AND THE
'SPECTER' OF BANKRUPTCY
Carolyn Hochstadter Dicker*
Over the past several years, the Federal Com-
munications Commission ("FCC" or "Commis-
sion") has auctioned strips of the electromagnetic
spectrum to companies interested in providing
wireless telephone personal communications serv-
ices ("PCS"). This article focuses on the broad-
band PCS C-Block auction which was primarily
limited to small business "entrepreneur" entities.
'The auction was designed to encourage the devel-
opment of, and foster competition among, small,
start-up wireless companies. In contrast to other
auctions of PCS spectrum, the C-Block auction in-
cluded bidding incentives, such as the ability to
pay 90% of the debt on a low-interest installment
basis, reduced up-front and down payment re-
quirements, and the use of bidding credits.
Pocket Communications ("Pocket"), the second
largest C-Block bidder, filed for bankruptcy in
March 1997.1 Prior to its filing, Pocket failed to
make the first of its installment payments and
upon filing, owed millions to the FCC.2 Other C-
Block bidders, including the fourth largest, Na-
tional Telecom PCS ("NatTel"), have similarly de-
faulted over the course of the C-Block process, or
are currently on the verge thereof. Most recently,
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I Allan Sloan, The FCC Didn't Catch a Code, And Thereby
Hangs a Wireless Tale, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1997, at C3.
2 Debra Wayne, FCC To Change C-Block Schedule: Pocket Ad-
mits Struggle To Keep Afloat, RADIO COMm. REP., Mar. 31, 1997,
at 1, 38 [hereinafter Radio Comm. Rep.].
3 Fourteen affiliates of General Wireless, Inc. filed for
bankruptcy on Oct. 20, 1997. General Wireless originally bid
about $1.1 billion for its PCS licenses and still owes more
than $953 million to the FCC. Second PCS 'C'Block Bidder Files
for Bankruptcy Protection, TELECOMMS. REP. INT'L., INC., Oct.
27, 1997; General Wireless Affiliates Seek Chapter 11 in Dallas,
THE DAiLY BA K'JR. REv., Oct. 28, 1997, at 2, 7; Statement by FCC
Chairman Reed Hundt on Bankruptcy Filing by PCS C-Block Licen-
in October 1997, affiliates of General Wireless,
Inc., another large C-Block bidder, followed
Pocket's lead and filed for bankruptcy. 3 These in-
cidents have raised issues of first impression and
are of great concern because they threaten the in-
tegrity of the C-Block auction process, together
with its goal of helping small businesses, and also
threaten the federal government's collection of
approximately $10 billion in auction proceeds
which have already been included in the federal
budget. This article discusses the legal and practi-
cal issues that might arise in the context of a PCS
licensee's insolvency or bankruptcy filing, pursu-
ant to which the FCC would be placed in the dual
and conflicting role of regulator and first priority
secured creditor.
BANKRUPTCY CONCEPTS
Bankruptcy courts have found licenses to be ex-
ecutory contracts. 4 Although FCC licenses appear
to have attributes of an executory contract, courts
neither apply nor discuss executory contract law
in dealing with the transfer of FCC licenses in
bankruptcy. 5 Instead, courts generally defer to
see General Wireless, FCC News, Oct. 27, 1997.
4 See, e.g., Krafsur v. UOP (In re El Paso Refinery, L.P.),
196 B.R. 58, 72 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996).
5 An FCC license has the following attributes of an execu-
tory contract: (1) validity of the license is conditioned on the
licensee's performance of its obligations under the license
(including build-out requirements that are capital-consum-
ing) and the related installment payment plan note and se-
curity agreement, as well as its compliance with the Commu-
nications Act of 1934, regulations and opinions of the FCC
and of the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, (2) the ab-
sence of any ownership fights by the licensee in the subject
matter of the license, (3) the right of the FCC to cancel the
license in the event the licensee does not perform, and (4)
the requirement of FCC approval of any assignment of the
license. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 310(d) (1997); 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.2110(e)(4) (1996); see also Form Broadband PCS C-Block
License [hereinafter License] (including, within its terms, all
of the above "executory" items); Form Installment Payment
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telecommunications law regarding restructure, or
assumption and assignment of FCC licenses in
bankruptcy and thus, have blessed such transac-
tions, subject to FCC approval.6 For the most
part, these cases have involved radio broadcast
licenses. Transfer of a PCS license in bankruptcy,
however, is an issue of first impression. There-
fore, it is unclear in the case of these financially
strapped C-Block licensees and, in view of the pol-
icy issues at stake, whether pertinent FCC rules
and policy statements will be strictly enforced.
Most courts agree that, once an FCC licensee
files for bankruptcy, its license becomes property
of the bankruptcy estate ("estate"). 7 Technically,
an FCC license must be transferred to the debtor
in possession ("DIP") or trustee and, outside of
bankruptcy, this transfer requires formal FCC ap-
proval." To expedite this transfer in bankruptcy,
however, it is accorded pro forma approval by the
FCC.9
Once the license is in the hands of the DIP or
trustee, the latter will generally attempt to create
Plan Security Agreement for Broadband PCS C-Block Auc-
tion, paras. 2, 8, 11 [hereinafter Security Agreement] (incorpo-
rating all of the above items); Form Installment Payment
Plan Note for Broadband PCS C-Block Auction, at p. 3 [here-
inafter Note] (providing that effectiveness of license is condi-
tioned upon compliance with obligations under Note, License
and telecommunications law).
6- See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service v. Subranni (In re At-
lantic Bus. and Community Dev. Corp.), 994 F.2d 1069, 1071
(3d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Atlantic]; LaRose v. FCC, 494 F.2d
1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding that the FCC abused its
discretion when it failed to consider recovery of creditors in
denying a license); In re Ridgely Communications, Inc., 139
B.R. 374, 375 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992); In re Smith, 94 B.R. 220,
221 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988); D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co.,
Inc. v. Lake Erie Communications, Inc. (In reD.H. Overmyer
Telecasting Co., Inc.), 35 B.R. 400, 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1983); In re WFDR, Inc., 10 B.R. 109, 111 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1981); In re Applications of Second Thursday Corp.
(WWGM), Nashville, Tenn., 25 F.C.C.2d 112, 115 (1970)
[hereinafter Second Thursday #2]; In re Applications of Second
Thursday Corp. (WWGM), Nashville, Tenn., 22 F.C.C.2d 515,
515-16 (1970) [hereinafter Second Thursday #1]; see also Shi-
mer v. Fugazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc.), 124 B.R. 426, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), appeal dismissed, 982 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter Fugazy #2] (describing that the Bankruptcy
Court directed the parties to obtain FCC approval of bank-
ruptcy sale, but ultimately ignored the FCC's refusal to ap-
prove transfer based on the FCC's lack of participation in the
proceedings).
7 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1997); See Atlantic, 994 F.2d at 1073;
Fugazy #2, 124 B.R. at 430; Ridgely, 139 B.R. at 376; Smith, 94
B.R. at 221; but see Overmyer, 35 B.R. at 401.
8 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1997); 47 C.F.R. § 24.839(a)
(1996); see Security Agreement, supra note 5, para. 2.
9 47 C.F.R. § 24.839(d)(5)(1996); LaRose, 494 F.2d at
1148; Smith, 94 B.R. at 221; Letter from William E. Kennard,
funds for the estate by offering the license for
sale. If the licensee is in default, the FCC could
theoretically cancel and thus, presumably re-auc-
tion the license.10 Such action would leave the
debtor and its creditors with no recourse to the
license, and possibly, with no recourse to any sur-
plus proceeds of re-auction. 1 In contrast, in the
event of sale, surplus proceeds would likely be al-
located to creditors.'2 Although one court has
held that cancellation of a license or per se refusal
to approve its transfer constitutes a violation of
the automatic stay created in bankruptcy, another
court, in dictum, has expressed the opposite
view. 13 The tenuous authority of the FCC in this
area is highlighted by attempts, over the last year,
to draft legislation granting the FCC explicit au-
thority to revoke and re-auction licenses of debt-
ors in bankruptcy. 14 In addition, at a June 1997
FCC forum on the subject of C-Block repayment,
the Commission itself questioned its authority in
bankruptcy proceedings. 15
Not surprisingly, therefore, when faced with a
then General Counsel of the FCC, and Michele C. Farquhar,
then Chief of the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, to
Leonard J. Kennedy, Esq. and Richard S. Denning, Esq., 11
FCC Rcd. 21572, 21574 (1996) (discussing Note and Security
Agreement) [hereinafter (-Block Letter].
10 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(e)(4)(iii)(1996); see Security
Agreement, supra note 5, para. 8(a).
11 See C-Block Letter, supra note 9, at 21576-77 (citing 47
U.S.C. § 309(0) (8) (1994)) (stating that all proceeds from the
use of competitive bidding shall be deposited in the Treasury
of the United States or used to cover certain of the Commis-
sion's costs); see also C-Block Letter, supra note 9, at 21578 n.4;
see Security Agreement, supra note 5, para. 8(d).
12 See C-Block Letter, supra note 9, at 21578 n.4; Security
Agreement, supra note 5, paras. 1-2 (granting third parties
subordinated security interest in proceeds of sale or disposi-
tion of license).
13 Compare Fugazy #2, 124 B.R. at 431 (stating that revoca-
tion of license by the FCC is not an act by governmental au-
thority to protect health and safety of public that would qual-
ify for exemption from automatic stay), with Overmyer, 35 B.R.
at 401 (ruling, without discussion, that stripping a broadcast
license, or refusing to allow the transfer or assignment of a
license qualify as actions by governmental authority which
are exempt from automatic stay); see 1I U.S.C. §§ 362(a),
(b) (4) (1994).
14 See Administration's Spectrum Revenue Proposal,
§ 1001 (a) (7) (F) (released week of June 9, 1997 by Office of
Management and Budget to be part of 1997 budget reconcili-
ation package, available via Telecommunications Reports,
<http://www.tr.com/online/spectrum.htm>) [hereinafter
Spectrum Revenue Proposal].
15 Carolyn Hochstadter Dicker, Notes from the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau Public Forum on "Broadband
PCS C and F Block Installment Payment Issues" (June 30,
1997) (on file with CoMMLAw CONSPECrus) [hereinafter
Notes from Public Forum].
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situation of financial distress, the FCC has consist-
ently expressed a preference for "market-oriented
solutions" to the prospect of bankruptcy. 16 FCC
rules provide for work-outs between the FCC and
a PCS licensee through the grant of grace periods
and/or restructuring of payment plans. Since the
inception of the C-Block process, the FCC has
stated its willingness to grant a three to six month
grace period for defaulting PCS licensees, during
which time the licensee could maintain its con-
struction efforts and/or operations while seeking
funds to continue payments or seek from the FCC
a restructured payment plan. 17 The FCC has
stated that it will evaluate requests for a grace pe-
riod on a case-by-case basis, and consider factors
such as the licensee's payment history, including
whether it has defaulted previously, how far into
the license term the default occurs, the reasons
for default, whether the licensee has met con-
struction build-out requirements, the licensee's fi-
nancial condition, and whether the licensee is
seeking a buyer pursuant to a distress sale.' The
FCC has further indicated that, when a licensee is
in bankruptcy, foreclosure or financial distress, a
presumption will exist in favor of granting a three
month grace period, commencing ninety days af-
ter the missed payment date, for a total of six
months.19 In addition, the FCC encourages work-
out arrangements between the licensee and its
outside lenders, stating that it would become in-
volved only in transfer situations.20
The availability of these out-of-court work-out
opportunities presumes that, within a three to six
month period, a PCS licensee would be able to
16 In re Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules-
Competitive Bidding Proceeding, 6 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 362,
369 (1997) [hereinafter 97 Amendment] (citing In re Amend-
ment of Parts 20 and 24 of the Commission's Rules - Broad-
band PCS Competitive Bidding and the Commercial Mobile
Radio Service Spectrum Cap, Amendment of the Commis-
sion's Cellular/PCS Cross-Ownership Rule, Report and Order,
11 FCC Rcd. 7824, para. 85, at 7864 (1996)); C-Block Letter,
supra note 9, at 21573-74 (citing In. re Implementation of Sec-
tion 309(I) of the Communications Act - Competitive Bid-
ding, Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 403
(1994)).
17 C-Block Letter, supra note 9, at 21573-75 (citing In re
Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Per-
sonal Communications Services, Second Report and Order, 8
FCC Rcd. 7700 (1993) and Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, supra note 16, at 471).
18 See id.
19 Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Staff Responds
to Questions About the Broadband PCS C-Block Auction, 78
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 727, 729-30 (1995); see 47 C.F.R.
procure financial backing sufficient to get itself
back on its feet. This has not turned out to be
feasible for the C-Block licensees. Therefore, a
more flexible solution will be required if the
FCC's goal is to achieve a restructuring of C-Block
debt. An alternative to restructuring would be the
sale of such debt. Although the FCC has always
been amenable to this work-out alternative, it has
consistently indicated that any such sale would be
conditioned on complete fulfillment of license
conditions. 21 This is likely to prove problematic
for C-Block licensees. Accordingly, in the absence
of a palatable restructuring proposal, these licen-
sees are likely to opt for bankruptcy in the hope
that FCC transfer requirements will not be strictly
enforced by a bankruptcy court.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ISSUES
In evaluating whether to approve a license
transfer, the FCC must determine whether the li-
censee's conduct, during the period in which it
held the license, qualifies it for renewal of the li-
cense. In bankruptcy proceedings involving radio
broadcast cases, the FCC has foregone this inquiry
where benefits to creditors significantly outweigh
benefits to a wrongdoer licensee. 22 This is known
as the "Second Thursday" doctrine. 23 In addition,
the FCC is required to consider the needs of pub-
lic end-users. 24 Nevertheless, the FCC is reluctant
to approve transfers to licensees who are guilty of
misconduct, leading to delays in approval of bank-
ruptcy sales.
25
Upon renewal, a PCS license may be sold in
§§ 1.2110(e)(4)(ii), (iii) (1996).
20 97 Amendment, supra note 16 (citing C-Block Letter, supra
note 9, at 21573).
21 Id. at 369; see C-Block Letter, supra note 9.
22 LaRose, 494 F.2d at 1147-48, followed by Shimer v. Fu-
gazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc.), 114 B.R. 865, 873-74
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); see Second Thursday #2, 25 F.C.C.2d at
114-15; Second Thursday #1, 22 F.C.C.2d at 518; accord Two If
By Sea Broadcasting Corp., 12 FCC Rcd. 2254 (1997) [here-
inafter Two If By Sea].
23 See LaRose, 494 F.2d at 1146; see generally Second Thurs-
day #1, 22 F.C.C.2d at 520 (explaining that a bankrupt wrong-
doer licensee may effectuate a sale for the benefit of inno-
cent creditors if this action will serve the public interest).
24 C-Block Letter, supra note 9, at 21574-75 (citing Fifth
Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 16, at 471); see La-
Rose, 494 F.2d at 1146; Second Thursday #2, 25 F.C.C.2d at 115;
In re Twelve Seventy, Inc., I F.C.C.2d 965, 969 (1965) (Cox,
dissenting commissioner) [hereinafter Twelve Seventy]; 97
Amendment, supra note 16.
25 See Second Thursday #2, 25 F.C.C.2d at 115-16 (approv-
1998]
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bankruptcy, subject to compliance with certain re-
strictions. In brief, these restrictions mandate
that a transfer be made to a qualified transferee
who assumes the payment obligations of the trans-
feror.26 In bankruptcy, such rules may be waived
by the FCC; however, full payment is nonetheless
required. 27 These provisions are designed to pre-
vent "unjust enrichment" of the licensee, and in
the C-Block context, require that principal and ac-
crued interest be paid to the Commission at the
time of transfer.28 Similar provisions require ad-
justments for any loss of eligibility to use bidding
credits. 29 Interestingly, because FCC rules require
that a PCS license transfer be accompanied by full
payment, sale of a PCS license in bankruptcy is
treated much like assumption and assignment of
an executory contact. Failure to restructure or as-
sign a PCS license, however, would not be analo-
gous to rejection of an executory contract. In-
stead, the result, at least outside of bankruptcy,
would be cancellation and re-auction.
The FCC's full payment requirements appear to
be in conflict with the bankruptcy policy favoring
restructuring of debt and equitable distribution
among creditors.30 While generally approving
FCC license sales in bankruptcy, courts are silent
on the issue of full repayment. 31 This is because
bankruptcy case law typically deals with the nor-
mal business failure of a radio station and focuses
on the role and value of the license as part of an
on-going concern. In contrast, the major issue in
the PCS C-Block context is the licensee's inability
to fulfill its financial obligations to the FCC.
ing sale upon petition for reconsideration, on grounds that
second proposal provided for better recovery to creditors
than first proposal); LaRose, 494 F.2d at 1149-50 (refusing to
approve sale which provided for 97.51% recovery to credi-
tors, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the
FCC's decision); see also Twelve Seventy, I F.C.C.2d at 967 (cit-
ing court's refusal to consider sale proposal without renewal
hearing, stating that creditors take risk that bankruptcy
might occur).
26 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2111(c), 24.839(d) (1996).
27 See id. at §§ 1.2111(c), 24.711(c), 24.839(a) (1996); 97
Amendment, supra note 16, at 369-70.
28 47 C.F.R. § 24.711 (c); see 97 Amendment, supra note 16,
at 378.
29 47 C.F.R. § 24.712(b) (2); see 97 Amendment, supra note
16, at 378. In addition, the Note and Security Agreement require
the payment of collection costs by a defaulting licensee re-
gardless of bankruptcy. Security Agreement, supra note 5, para.
8(e); see Note, supra note 5.
30 See C-Block Letter, supra note 9, at 21574-75 (citing Fifth
Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 16, at 471).
31 See, e.g., Atlantic, 994 F.2d at 1070; Fugazy #2, 124 B.R.
Although the case law is helpful in assessing how a
court might treat an FCC license transfer in bank-
ruptcy, it does not resolve the issues that may arise
in the typical PCS C-Block case. Again, attempts
to draft legislation strictly enforcing the FCC's full
payment obligations in bankruptcy demonstrate
the Commission's fear that they would not other-
wise be enforced by a bankruptcy court. 32 These
fears of the "unknowns of the bankruptcy process"




In light of these unknowns, and in order to sal-
vage the C-Block process, the FCC has begun to
relax its repayment rules, enforcing strictly only
those requirements pertaining to the first half of
the 10% down payment required of C-Block in-
stallment payers. Where this initial payment has
not been timely made, the FCC has canceled and
re-auctioned the license (as well as assessed de-
fault penalty payments).3 4 The FCC has been less
strict concerning both the second part of the
down payment and subsequently owed install-
ment payments. With respect to the second down
payment, the FCC has been flexible with respect
to minor delinquencies which neither affect the
timing of the auction, nor the FCC's review of the
applicant's qualifications. 35 For example, where
the delay in payment has been short (ranging
from one day to two weeks), and resulted from
administrative error, the FCC has waived its right
at 431; Ridgely, 139 B.R. at 375; Smith, 94 B.R. at 221; Second
Thursday #2, 25 F.C.C.2d at 115; see generally LaRose, 494 F.2d
1145 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
32 See Spectrum Revenue Proposal, supra note 14.
33 See Notes from Public Forum, supra note 15.
34 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g)(2), 1.2109(b),
24.704(a) (2), 24.708(b), 24.711(a) (2) (1996); 97 Amendment,
supra note 16, at 382-83; see generally In re BDPCS, Inc., Emer-
gency Petition for Waiver of Section 24. 711(a)(2) of the Commis-
sion's Rules, 12 FCC Rcd. 3230 (1997); In re Nat'l Telecom
PCS, Inc., Request for Waiver of Bid Withdrawal Payment and Ap-
plication for Authority to Construct a Personal Communications Sys-
tem on Frequency Block C in American Samoa, Market No. B492,
12 FCC Rcd. 10163 (1997); In re C.H. PCS, Inc., Request for
Waiver of Section 24. 711(a)(2) of the Commission's Rules, 11 FCC
Rcd. 9343 (1996); Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Will
Strictly Enforce Default Payment Rules, 11 FCC Rcd. 10853
(1996).
35 See In re Longstreet Communications Int'l, Inc., Request
for Waiver of Section 24.711(a)(2) of the Commission's Rules Re-
garding Market No. B012, 12 FCC Rcd. 1549, para. 8, at 1551-
52 (1997) [hereinafter Longstreet].
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to cancel the license, charging a late fee instead. 36
With respect to installment payments, the FCC
has frozen the pertinent deadlines, coincidentally
doing so on the very day that Pocket filed for
bankruptcy.37 At stake is nearly half of the $23 bil-
lion raised since 1994 when the PCS auctions be-
gan. The freeze was ordered pursuant to a formal
request by certain licensees that the payment
schedule be changed from quarterly to annual to
facilitate their access to capital.
38
The FCC's most recent and controversial en-
deavor in trying to keep the C-Block licensees out
of bankruptcy is its adoption last September of a
set of alternative solutions designed to strike a bal-
ance among the licensees' varying needs, and still
preserve the integrity of the auction process.
These alternatives range from strict enforcement
of FCC full payment rules to opportunities for
buy-out and/or return of the licenses in exchange
for a certain amount of debt forgiveness and at-
tendant penalties. 39 Criticism has already been
voiced by interested parties, including some of
36 In re RFW, Inc., Request for Waiver of Section 24.711(a)(2)
of the Commission's Rules Regarding Market No. B230, 12 FCC
Rcd. 1536, paras. 7-8, at 1538 (1997); Longstreet, supra note
35; In re MFRI, Inc., Request for Waiver of Section 24.711(a)(2) of
the Commission's Rules Regarding Market No. B435, 12 FCC Rcd.
1540, para. 8, at 1542 (1997); In, re Roberts-Roberts & Assoc.,
LLC, Request for Waiver of Section 24. 711(a)(2) of the Commis-
sion's Rules Regarding Various BTA Markets, 12 FCC Rcd. 1825,
paras. 7-8, at 1827-28 (1997); In re Wireless Telecomm. Co.,
Request for Waiver of Section 24. 711(a)(2) of the Commission's
Rules Regarding Market No. B411, 12 FCC Rcd. 1544, para. 7, at
1546-47 (1997); In re Southern Communications Sys., Inc.,
Request for Waiver of Section 24. 711 (a)(2) of the Commission's
Rules Regarding Market No. B085, 12 FCC Rcd. 1532, paras. 7-8,
at 1534 (1997).
37 See In re Installment Payments for PCS Licensees, DA 97-
649 (1997).
38 See id.
39 See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules Re-
garding Installment Payment Financing for Personal Com-
munications Services (PCS) Licensees, Second Report and Order
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WT Docket No. 97-82 (Sept.
25, 1997); FCC Adopts Menu of Options for Modifying C-Block
Payments; Seeks Comment on Implementation of Options (Rpt. No.
WT 97-37) (WT Dkt. No. 97-82), FCC News, Sept. 13, 1990.
The FCC order reinstates the deadline for making install-
ment payments to Mar. 31, 1998 (one year from the date of
the freeze) with the licensee being required to choose one of
the following four alternative options byJan. 15, 1998:
Option 1: Existing Note Obligations. Licensees may elect to con-
tinue making payments under their original installment pay-
ment plan notes in accordance with the terms of those notes
and the Commission's rules.
Option 2: Disaggregation. A licensee may elect to disaggregate
one-half of its spectrum and return such spectrum to the
FCC for re-auction. The licensee must disaggregate spec-
trum for all of the Basic Trading Area ("BTA") licenses it
the Commissioners themselves. 4°1 In fact, the
General Wireless bankruptcy filings exemplify the
dissatisfaction of the licensees with these restruc-
turing options. At publication, the FCC was seek-
ing comment on the re-auction process that is
contemplated by these options.
The repayment issues have been further com-
plicated by antitrust concerns raised by various
bidders through complaints and/or petitions
filed with the FCC and in court, accusing rival
companies of collusive actions to corner certain
PCS markets. 41 Some bidders are accused of us-
ing bidding signals to drive up the price for
licenses sought by rival bidders. Yet another form
of collusion has been alleged in a suit brought
against Pocket in a New York federal district court
just prior to its bankruptcy filing.42 In that suit,
brought by NatTel against Pocket and others, the
defendants are accused of diverting to themselves
investment funds allegedly "earmarked for the
plaintiffs."43 NatTel is seeking damages of at least
owns within any Major Trading Area ("MTA"). In exchange,
the licensee will have the proportionate half of its debt for-
given. One half of the downpayment will be applied toward
the debt for the retained spectrum, while the other half will
be forfeited. The licensee will be prohibited from rebidding
for the returned spectrum or otherwise acquiring it in the
secondary market for two years from the date of re-auction.
Option 3: Amnesty. A licensee may return all of its licenses, in
exchange for which all of the licensee's outstanding debt will
be forgiven. Its downpayment will be forfeited. It will be per-
mitted to bid on its returned licenses at re-auction, and there
is no restriction on after-market acquisitions. An exception
to the all-or-nothing requirement would be made as to licen-
sees that have met or exceeded the five year build-out re-
quirements by Sept. 25, 1997. These licensees may retain
their built-out BTAs, but must also keep the other BTAs in
the MTA where the build-out requirement has been met.
Option 4: Prepayment. A licensee may purchase any of its
licenses at the face value originally bid by the licensee. The
licensee must purchase all the BTA licenses it owns within
any single MTA. The licensee may use 70% of its downpay-
ment and any additional monies that it is able to raise to buy
out its licenses; the remaining 30% of the deposit and any
unused portion of the 70% will be forfeited. Licenses that
are not prepaid must be returned for re-auction, in exchange
for which the corresponding debt will be forgiven. The licen-
see may not rebid for the returned licenses or acquire them
in the secondary market for a period of two years from the
date of re-auction. See id.
40 See id.; Stephanie N. Mehta and John R. Wilke, FCC
Plan to Aid Wireless Carriers Is Tougher Than Firms Hoped For,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1997, at B5.
41 See Radio Comm. Rep., supra note 2.
42 See id.
43 See id. The defendants were cited for "violation of the
Sherman Act, breach of contract, tortious interference with





Telecommunications law and policy does not
permit the grant of a direct security interest in an
FCC license to a third party because such a grant
might endanger the independence of the licen-
see, as well as interfere with the FCC's plenary
power to protect the public interest in the air-
waves.45 The FCC permits the grant of a security
interest in proceeds of an FCC authorized trans-
fer, but it is generally subordinated to the FCC's
first priority interest.
4 6
Additional security can be obtained by taking a
security interest in the assets of the licensee's busi-
ness and/or obtaining a pledge of its stock.4 7 Be-
cause the respective values of a license and related
business assets tend to be maximized upon sale of
the going concern, all of the above forms of secur-
ity, taken together, would bring the lender as
close as possible to having a security interest in
the license itself. The value of the security would
be further enhanced by the "bare license" policy
of the FCC, pursuant to which the FCC will gener-
ally not approve the sale of a license without an
accompanying transfer of the related facility's
physical assets. 48  Conversely, if the assets are
somehow lost, taken over, or become inoperable,
cancellation of the license could result. More-
44 See id.
45 See Atlantic, 994 F.2d at 1074 (citing Smith, 94 B.R. at
221 (quoting In re Merkley, 94 F.C.C.2d 829-30 (1983))); 97
Amendment, supra note 16, at 368-69; C-Block Letter, supra note
9, at 21572-73.
46 97 Amendment, supra note 16 (citing C-Block Letter, supra
note 9, at 21572); see Atlantic, 994 F.2d at 1074-75 (citing
Ridgely, 139 B.R. at 378-79); Security Agreement, supra note 5,
paras. 1-2.
47 See Howard M. Liberman & Gerald Stevens-Kittner,
Lending to Broadcast Stations-Part 1, LOAN OFFICER'S LEGAL
ALERT, 5, 6 (1989); Jack Whitley, A Printer on Commercial
over, the security interest in the sale proceeds will
not survive if the license is canceled. 49 Accord-
ingly, although the FCC encourages the financing
of PCS licenses by outside lenders, the FCC, act-
ing in the role of both regulator and first priority
secured creditor, ultimately controls the rights
and remedies of all other creditors. These rights
and remedies could range from collection of the
full debt amount from the proceeds of a distress
sale to loss of all rights in the collateral through
cancellation of the license.
CONCLUSION
How the FCC will handle these issues is the
principal question facing players in the wireless
industry. The FCC seems concerned about the
specter of bankruptcy filings by its C-Block licen-
sees, despite both the historic deference accorded
telecommunications law in bankruptcy proceed-
ings and the fact that the FCC would enjoy the
position of first priority secured creditor.
In attempting to keep its licensees out of bank-
ruptcy, the FCC is encouraging distressed bidders
to restructure under the September 1997 propo-
sal - and to do so quickly. As the FCC now ap-
pears to recognize, a near-term resolution of this
issue is necessary to attract capital and forestall
the C-Block's loss of market share to larger wire-
less companies.
Transactions Under the Communications Act, ILL. B.J., 30-31
(1983).
48 See Two If By Sea, supra note 22, at 2254-55; In re Appli-
cations of Constellation Communications, Inc., et al., 11 FCC
Rcd. 18502, 18515 (1996); In re Application of American Mu-
sic Radio and Khym, Inc., 10 FCC Rcd. 8769, 8772 (1995); In
re Applications of BBC License Subsidiary L.P. and SF Green
Bay License Subsidiary, Inc., 10 FCC Rcd. 7926 (1995) (citing
Radio KDAN, 11 F.C.C.2d 934, 935 (1968)); In re Application
of Donald L. Horton and Voice of the Caverns, Inc., 10
F.C.C.2d 271, 273 (1967).
49 See Security Agreement, supra note 5, para. 2.
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